Abstract

Four experiments tested a proposal that hierarchically and partially restrictive trait dimensions pertaining to morality can be explained by Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Consistent with the proposal, Experiment 1 demonstrated that people change their positive expectancies about others at a faster rate in response to violations of perfect than imperfect duties. In addition, however, Experiment 2 showed that situational factors mitigate the negative trait attributions resulting from violations of imperfect duties more than those resulting from violations of perfect duties. Experiment 3 demonstrated that differences in trait attributions as a result of violations of perfect or imperfect duties are not due to implications of these violations for future behavior. Finally, Experiment 4 further supported the prediction that situational factors mitigate the negative trait attributions caused by violations of imperfect duties more than those caused by violations of perfect duties.

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