Abstract
The literature on vote trading and, more generally, strategic voting has largely been one of negative results. The most prominent is instability of voting or vote trading outcomes [Gibbard; Satterthwaite; Riker/Brams; Oppenheimer, 1973, 1975; Uslaner/Davis; Koehler; Enelow/Koehler; Schwartz]. There are, however, grounds for optimism about the prospect for finding some stability conditions [Bernholz, 1978; Oppenheimer, 1979]. In this paper, I shall examine some conditions for social choice in a democratic society which may lead to the adoption of the most preferred outcome (as determined by the Condorcet criterion, that outcome which is preferred to all others in pairwise comparisons). Specifically, I shall examine how strategic voting and vote trading might yield such outcomes under varying distributions of voter preferences across issues. The critical distinction here is between preferences which are independent across votes and those which are not.
Published Version
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