Abstract
ABSTRACTThe Chinese experience shows that equity crowdfunding (ECF) platforms are not neutral intermediaries in linking investment opportunities with sources of funds. This article contends that, in the context of the Chinese market, private ordering alone will not address the agency and information asymmetry problems inherent in ECF platforms. The contractual designs adopted by numerous Chinese platforms, especially that of the syndicate contract, not only fail to address the conflicting interests but also introduce additional conflicts. Other market mechanisms such as reputation, exit and private insurance, are also insufficient to ensure investor protection. Therefore, this article proposes specific regulatory measures to enhance investor protection.
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