Managing the Bargaining Table Through Flexibility Mechanisms: The Benefits of Coalitions and Sequencing

Abstract

Progress in global climate change negotiations is inhibited by complicated and diffuse conflict between paradigms (expressed through norms and institutions), and self-enforcing dynamic processes. Paradigms that aim to maintain structure in the relations between actors become subjects for modifications or replacement as dynamic processes unfold, leading to tensions when negotiating decisions. As this research project argues, managing bargaining during global climate talks is conditioned by strategies to make static paradigms and dynamic processes mutually tolerable when not compatible, particularly because both paradigms and dynamic processes contribute to the robust stability of the system. Both the ability to adapt to new dynamics and the capacity to reduce contingencies through norms and institutions constantly exposes actors to complex learning processes when making decisions. Negotiators, frustrated with tedious and time-consuming decision-making—for example during single negotiation rounds—seek both general and mini-agreements, including framework agreements, and implement plans that intend to provide structures to the social relations and frameworks of future decisions. Nevertheless, by the time decisions are made, new political dynamics often arise that challenge reached outcomes, forcing the negotiation process to start anew and increasing frustration during negotiation.