Abstract

The idea of using American power ‘for purposes which we regard as good’ had been a feature of British foreign policy during the Labour governments of 1945–51. In the 1950s, however, Anthony Eden elevated ‘power-by-proxy’ to the status of strategy as he sought a means to maintain Britain's world role in the face of serious economic enervation. In the event, Eden's innate mistrust of the United States rendered him an imperfect front-man for the strategy – as Suez confirmed. However, the strategy was subsequently embraced by Eden's successor as Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, who from 1957 placed Anglo-American relations at the centre of his government's foreign policy. Yet like Eden before him, the more pro-American Macmillan ultimately doubted whether ‘power-by-proxy’ could be accomplished by reliance on the United States. Hence, at the close of the 1950s, the strategy underwent an evolution to include a new British relationship with Europe as a complement to the original, though increasingly unreliable, American proxy.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.