Managing Leadership in the Indo-Pacific: The United States’ South Asia Strategy Revisited

Abstract

The United States’ South Asia strategy has been based on the calculation of its overall national security priorities. In practice, when U.S. priorities are at odds with those of other regional powers, Washington tends to adopt a “no-expectations” psychological approach toward its regional partners to avoid disappointment, a technical “de-hyphenation strategy” to improve policy efficiency, and practical cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of its South Asia strategy. However, Washington often has to come to terms with the realities on the ground with regard to its leadership role in South Asia. For the time being, Washington has articulated its strategic objective in South Asia, that is, a regional balance of power in favor of the United States vis-a-vis its perceived competitor, China. Therefore, it has conducted conditional cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan on land, and committed support for India on security issues in the Indian Ocean, so as to hedge against China’s growing presence in South Asia. The enhancement of U.S.-India defense and security cooperation has fueled China’s suspicion of India’s intention to join the U.S.-led coalition against it. By the logic of balance of power, the United States will continue to regard India as a strategic counterweight to China, which is likely to increase the possibility of strategic tensions and conflicts between China and India that may finally entangle the United States.