Abstract
Governments face many constraints in attracting talented managers to the public sector, which often lacks high-powered incentives. In this paper, we study how a civil service reform in Chile changed the effectiveness of a vital group of public sector managers: school principals. First, we estimate principal effectiveness by using an extension of the canonical teacher value-added model. Then we evaluate the effect of the reform on principal effectiveness using a difference-in-differences approach. We find that public schools appointed more effective managers and improved their students’ outcomes after increasing the competitiveness and transparency of their selection process. (JEL D73, H83, I21, J24, J45, O15)
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