MANAGERIAL INTERACTIONS OF THE STATE AND CORPORATIONS IN RUSSIA IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT

Abstract

The article is devoted to the analysis of the development of state corporatism in Russia, its predisposition to a paternalistic-oriented model of administrative “managed democracy”, to the predominance of corporate, departmental, and narrow-clan interests over nation-wide interests. It is noted that corporatism in Russia has the political economy essence, which makes it possible to compare the Russian state structure with its “resource-oriented” component with the model of the “state of taxpayers”. The article investigates the current stage of corporatization, the manifestation of which was the availability of formal and informal mechanisms for coordinating interests, intensifying the exchange of personnel between government institutions and business-structures. The article analyzes the quality of Russian public administration according to six parameters proposed by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). They include: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The study of the influence of informal relations in the management interaction between the state (rentier state) and corporate structures confirms the conjugation of activity in seeking rent with corruption, inefficiency in public spending, with the development of democracy, the emergence of authoritarian institutions, political stability/instability. There is a fairly definite correlation of the influence of these factors on the state of national security as its threats. Bureaucratic economy, problems of management effectiveness may pose a threat to national security.