Managerial equity incentives and anti-dilutive convertible debt decisions

Abstract

PurposeThis paper aims to examine whether high equity incentives motivate executives to avoid issuing convertible debt and/or to design convertible debt issues as anti-dilutive to earnings-per-share (EPS).Design/methodology/approachTests are conducted using the Heckman two-step probit model to control for potential self-selection bias between firms that issue straight debt and those that issue convertible debt. Further, analyses are conducted separately and jointly for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to assess the differential impact of CEOs’ and CFOs’ equity incentives on convertible debt issuance and design decisions.FindingsFirms are more likely to design convertible debt issues as anti-dilutive to EPS when CFOs have high levels of equity incentives, but only when the firm stock price is sensitive to diluted EPS. High CEOs’ equity incentives have limited impact of convertible debt issuance and design decisions.Research limitations/implicationsThe main limitation of this study is the generalizability of the findings and implications of this study due to the smaller sample size of convertible debt issues.Originality/valuePrior research has shown that bonus incentives influence CEOs with disincentive for EPS dilution and motivate them to make anti-dilutive financing decisions. Further, there is evidence that high equity incentives motivate CEOs to manage earnings to boost short-term prices. This study extends prior literature by showing that high equity incentives provide executives with disincentive for EPS dilution and motivate CFOs to design convertible debt issues as anti-dilutive to EPS possibly to avoid reduced stock prices. Further, this study shows that CFOs have greater influence over convertible debt design choices than CEOs do.