Abstract
This research paper examines the information content and managerial incentives for labour cost voluntary disclosures for a sample of United States publicly traded companies. We focus on labour productivity and managerial efficiency in labour usage and argue that these human capital indicators could provide valuable information to capital market participants seeking human resource‐type of performance measures and signals. Labour productivity and efficiency indicators are estimated following a production function approach and are included in logistic regressions to help explain and predict labour cost voluntary disclosure decisions. We find that labour productivity and managerial efficiency in labour use indicators are generally different between disclosing and non‐disclosing firms, and that proprietary information costs and political cost proxies are significantly related to labour costs voluntary disclosure, consistent with previous literature. These empirical results corroborate the ‘proprietary information’ hypothesis of voluntary disclosure where the strategic costs of disclosure outweigh the signaling benefit from disclosing human capital information.
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More From: Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting
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