Making the WTO (Not So) Great Again: The Case Against Responding to the Trump Trade Agenda Through Reform of WTO Rules on Subsidies and State Enterprises

Abstract

A range of WTO scholars, policy experts, and governmental officials have bought into the notion that the Trump Administration’s unilateralism and its assault on China’s trade policies and practices could and should be channeled instead into WTO reform efforts. While dealing with China through unilateral tariff hikes and more recently a bilateral phase I agreement, the notion of addressing some concerns through WTO reform has not fallen entirely on a deaf ear in the Administration. Thus, Japan and the EU have been able to engage the Administration in an initiative to revise and add new WTO rules in the areas of subsidies, state enterprises, and forced technology transfer. This article offers a critical assessment of this initiative, arguing that by and large the proposed changes will add incoherence to existing WTO rules and make it more difficult for WTO Members to engage in economic and industrial policies that are needed, for example, to the address the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.