Abstract

This article critically assesses state–market relations through a comparative firm-level study of state-led development in the China–Myanmar border region. It develops a framework that foregrounds how market building is a contingent and multi-scalar process that underpins the reproduction of stable state rule. The framework is utilized to examine state-led attempts in Ruili, a border city in Yunnan province, to attract Yinxiang, a privately owned firm, and Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Corporation (BAIC), a state-owned enterprise (SOEs), to launch flagship manufacturing projects. The contrasting performance of these firms—Yinxiang successfully captured its target market in Myanmar while BAIC did not even commence production—foregrounds a pronounced tension in the ongoing market reforms. On the one hand, attempts at giving market actors more autonomy in resource allocation through supply-side structural reforms continue to be shaped by the institutional legacy of reciprocal accountability. On the other hand, the Chinese state’s willingness to allow BAIC’s investment to fail suggests it is serious about subjecting both local governments and SOEs to demand-side discipline. These findings collectively generate one distinct contribution to existing research on state–market relations: market activities are embedded within state-building processes in place-specific and often unpredictable ways.

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