Abstract

Abstract This paper reevaluates the history of how some anti-war realists have assessed the relationship between democracy and armed conflict. To do so, I turn to a central realist figure: Kenneth Waltz. Drawing on newly available archival sources and his published work, I explore Waltz’s shifting relationship with American democracy, foreign policymaking, and war. I focus on his career-long anti-war commitments, tracing his foreign policy engagements over the half century of his academic career. Early on, Waltz argued in favor of American democracy as a source of adaptive, effective foreign policy. Gradually, however, his views shifted. After the Cold War and especially after 9/11, his anti-war beliefs and belief in democratic foreign policymaking came increasingly into tension. He moved from defending American democratic foreign policymaking to calling for structural constraints from without. We see this in Waltz’s late-life endorsement of the Iranian nuclear program, which was motivated not just by his well-known optimism about proliferation, but also by the hope that an Iranian nuclear arsenal would deter American intervention in the Middle East. Waltz’s experience has implications both for how we read his body of work and for how we understand realist attempts to shape foreign policy.

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