Mackie's motivational argument

Abstract

Mackie doubted anything objective could have the motivational properties of a value (Mackie 1977). And in thinking we are morally required to act in a certain way, he said, we attribute objective value to the action. Since nothing has objective value, these moral judgments are all false. As to whether Mackie proved his error theory, opinions vary. But there is broad agreement on one issue. A litany of examples, ranging from amoralism to depression to downright evil, has everyone convinced that Mackie vastly overstated the motivational implications of moral judgment. Mackie did go overboard. But did he have to? I think not. Even on the most modest motivational assumptions, Mackie can make objective value look queer and morality look like a sham. I begin with a sketch. The Argument (1) If there were such a thing as objective value, recognizing it would be recognizing a reason for action (2) If there were such a thing as objective value, recognizing it would be recognizing a property that is there independently of one's desires (3) The recognition of any reason for action has a special connection with the will (4) The recognition of a property that is there independently of one's desires cannot have that connection with the will So, (5) There can be no such thing as objective value (6) To think one is morally required to act in a certain way is to attribute objective value to actions of that sort So, (7) The thought that one is under a moral requirement is always false Mackie first goes after objective value. Then he takes aim at moral judgments. Let us take these two stages in order.