Mach’s phenomenalism and the British reception of mendelism

Abstract

The assimilation of Mendel’s paper into Britain took place in an Edwardian social context. This paper concentrates on the interplay of empirical and philosophical issues in this reception. A feature of the British reception of mendelism, not duplicated elsewhere, was the role of phenomenalist philosophies of science as developed by the physicist–mathematician and scientific methodologist Karl Pearson from the philosophical positions of Austrian physicist Ernst Mach and British mathematician William Clifford. Pearson’s philosophy of science forms the background to his subsequent collaboration with the zoologist W.F.R. Weldon. In this collaborative work, Pearson developed powerful statistical techniques for analyzing Weldon’s empirical data on organic variation. Pearson’s statistical analysis of causation and his rejection of hidden entities and causes in the explanation of evolutionary change formed the philosophical component of this program. The arguments of Pearson and Weldon were first brought to bear against the pre-Mendel ‘discontinuist’ analyses of variation of William Bateson. The introduction of Mendel’s paper into these empirical and methodological debates consequently resulted in mathematically sophisticated attacks on Mendel’s claims by Pearson and Weldon. This paper summarizes this history and argues for the creative importance of this biometrical resistance to Mendelism.