Abstract

In the 2011 parliamentary election campaign in Estonia, two church buildings fulfilled the function of inclusion by integrating the sentiments and identity of the members of cultural constituencies, and the function of exclusion by drawing symbolic boundaries between the current national government and the opposition and between the Estonian cultural mainstream and the Russophone minority, which cannot be drawn legally. For the parties of the national government St John’s Lutheran Church in St Petersburg was a symbol of Estonian nationalism. For their main political opponents the Orthodox church in the Lasnamäe district of Tallinn symbolised the cultural identity of Estonian Russian-speaking residents and electorate. While this development exemplifies ‘desecularisation’ in the dimension of collective cultural identities, I argue against a too simplistic interpretation of ‘desecularisation’ and for a more nuanced understanding of how religion may play a role even in a very secularised society and polity like Estonia. I theorise ‘desecularisation’ in Estonian politics by distinguishing the types of religion and nationalism that were involved and critically analysing the relationship between religion and nationalism in this process. I argue that the electoral campaign of 2011 testifies to a small shift towards a more religious definition of social identities, which may not re-occur with the same passions and intensity in future. After the accession to the European Union in 2004, the pre-electoral symbolic sacralisation of ethnic identities, however, has become an established practice during the Estonian parliamentary elections.

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