Luhmann como intérprete de Husserl: El problema del sentido

Abstract

A common interpretation of the relation between Niklas Luhmann´s theory of social systems and Edmund Husserl´s phenomenology maintains that the concepts of meaning of both authors are close to each other. This reading was elaborated by some commentators and emphatically encouraged by Luhmann himself. The aim of our paper is to examine critically such an interpretation. We argue that phenomenological and systemic perspectives do not really match regarding the concept of meaning. What follows will show how the sociologist generalized concepts in social and psychic systems, which Husserl elaborated in order to shed light on consciousness. On the other hand, we will point out that while Luhmann focused on the matter of meaning from a functionalist and empirical perspective, Husserl showed this issue by describing the essential structures of transcendental subjectivity. Equally, we will hold that while Luhmann´s concept of meaning has to do with self-reference of psychic and social systems, Husserl´s theory stresses hetero-reference of consciousness. Throughout this paper we will state that every time the sociologist interpreted the notions of horizon and world according to the concepts of complexity and contingency, he surely moved away from phenomenology. These aspects lead us to point out that between one and another perspective in reference to meaning, disagreements prevail over affinities. The differentiation of language and meaning and the approach to the concept of world as a horizon unity, which cannot be reduced to a mere addition of things, are shown as convergences between both authors.