Abstract

This paper constructs a model of child labor where siblings differ in birth order and credit constrained parents use the labor income from their first-born child to fund the schooling of later-born children. We show how in this environment, coercive child labor policies may backfire, increasing long-run child labor and reducing human capital. This suggests that intra-sibling redistribution is an important tool for the economic progress of families in developing countries.

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