Abstract
ABSTRACTThis article argues that, at a tactical level, loyalist terrorism in the Irish border region between 1972 and 1974 worked. Cross-border attacks including bombings in Irish towns prompted the Irish government to reinforce security along the border—a long-standing loyalist demand. The loyalist campaign led to the IRA embarking on an effort to punish those who were believed to have passed information to loyalists, resulting in the killing of an Irish Protestant senator and widespread condemnation of the organization in the Republic of Ireland. However, short-term gains were outweighed by a growing perception among nationalists that the British state tolerated or even colluded in such attacks, undermining the British Army’s campaign to gain trust (and information) within the Catholic population of Northern Ireland. The article also contends that middle-class loyalists played an important role in mobilizing and equipping loyalist paramilitary organizations. It concludes that the British Army showed an excessive tolerance of loyalists with political capital or ties to the security forces, despite evidence that such individuals were directly supporting the activities of loyalist paramilitaries.
Highlights
This article argues that, at a tactical level, loyalist terrorism in the Irish border region between 1972 and 1974 worked
I argue that class matters: it is not possible, for example, to understand the British Army’s indulgence of the leadership of a loyalist group like Down Orange Welfare (DOW) without at least some understanding of the social backgrounds of its leading members
Unlike another military veterans’ paramilitary group tolerated by the state, the Catholic Ex-Servicemen’s Association (CESA), DOW had a large arsenal of weapons and acted as an armorer to other paramilitary organizations, including those from the town of Portadown who were operating in the West Ulster border area.[25] ly Secondly, the article goes on to evaluate the effect of the overlooked cross-border loyalist border campaign that occurred on the County Fermanagh border with the Republic of Ireland between 1972 and 1974
Summary
This article argues that, at a tactical level, loyalist terrorism in the Irish border region between 1972 and 1974 worked. Jim Cusack have briefly noted that paramilitary leaders in rural areas were often from a middle rather than a working-class background, which impacted upon their relationships with the state.[22] Here I argue that class matters: it is not possible, for example, to understand the British Army’s indulgence of the leadership of a loyalist group like Down Orange Welfare (DOW) without at least some understanding of the social backgrounds of its leading members.
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