Abstract
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is widely spread in many security applications. Producing secured low-cost and low-power RFID tags is a challenge. The used of lightweight encryption algorithms can be an economic solution for these RFID security applications. This article proposes low cost countermeasure to secure RFID tags against Electromagnetic Side Channel Attacks (EMA). Firstly, we proposed a parallel architecture of PRESENT block cipher that represents a one way of hiding countermeasures against EMA. 200 000 Electromagnetic traces are used to attack the proposed architecture, whereas 10 000 EM traces are used to attack an existing serial architecture of PRESENT. Then we proposed a countermeasure at mutual authentication protocol by limiting progressively the number of EM traces. This limitation prevents the attacker to perform the EMA. The proposed countermeasure is based on time delay function. It requires 960 GEs and represents a low cost solution compared to existing countermeasures at primitive block cipher (2471 GEs).
Highlights
Passive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tag consists of an integrated circuit (IC) attached to an antenna
Naija Yassine et al [16] proposed a HF tag architecture respecting the IEC/ISO 14443 Type A [1]. This architecture is based on the implementation of the PRESENT block cipher in Mifare Ultralight C mutual authentication protocol
We focus our study to the Electromagnetic Side Channel Attack (EMA)
Summary
Passive RFID tag consists of an integrated circuit (IC) attached to an antenna. This integrated circuit is entirely remotely powered from the RF reader. Naija Yassine et al [16] proposed a HF tag architecture respecting the IEC/ISO 14443 Type A [1] This architecture is based on the implementation of the PRESENT block cipher in Mifare Ultralight C mutual authentication protocol. This article proposes a low cost countermeasure at the authentication protocol level by limiting the number of successive wrong authentication requests This limitation prevents the attacker to save enough electromagnetic traces to perform the EMA. We choose to study the vulnerability of an existing mutual authentication protocol proposed by Sai Seshabhattar et al [15] against EMA This protocol integrating PRESENT block cipher is used for low cost full-fledged RFID tags.
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