Low-carbon technology collaborative innovation in industrial cluster with social exclusion: An evolutionary game theory perspective.

Abstract

As governments implement low-carbon economy widely, boosting low-carbon transformation in industrial clusters has become a challenge. This study establishes an evolutionary game model of low-carbon technology collaborative innovation based on spatial public goods game to solve the free-riding problem effectively in research and development. By introducing a social exclusion mechanism, we explore the requirements for the emergence of cooperation between enterprises, and we consider the heterogeneity and scale-free characteristics of industrial clusters comprehensively. Simulation results confirm that social exclusion can significantly promote cooperation as a form of cooperation with additional cost. When exclusion cost decreases and probability increases, an excluder can survive in a lower enhancement factor, which guarantees a stable exclusion mechanism. Furthermore, this mechanism is key to forming and maintaining cooperative behavior. When a cluster follows a scale-free distribution, the sparse network structure can avoid cooperation collapse. Moreover, heterogeneous investment is a robust alternative in the face of invading defectors. This study provides a new understanding to promote the collaborative innovation of enterprises in industrial clusters.