Low-Carbon Collaboration in the Supply Chain under Digital Transformation: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis

Abstract

In the face of the challenges posed by the need to drastically decrease carbon emissions, all agents in the supply chain need to strengthen low-carbon collaboration with the support of digital transformation. This study sets up a low-carbon collaboration evolutionary game model of the supply chain based on benefit sharing by introducing digital transformation. The equilibrium-point stability of the supply chain is then analyzed under two separate conditions—i.e., less and more government rewards and punishments compared to supply-chain agents’ strategic risk cost. Furthermore, based on the evolutionary game model, this study draws the system dynamics (SD) flow diagram to analyze the research problem quantitatively. The main results show that: (1) low-carbon benefit-driven effects promotes collaboration benefit sharing, thereby increasing the probability of low-carbon collaboration; (2) digital transformation is an essential regulator of low-carbon collaboration in the supply chain and can amplify the low-carbon benefit-driven effect; (3) collaboration benefit sharing can perfectly coordinate the vertical supply chain under low-carbon collaboration; and (4) government support and management are critical links in the low-carbon collaboration formation path of the supply chain. This research provides theoretical support for low-carbon collaboration in the supply chain under digital transformation.