Looking Back

Abstract

hen thinking back in the realm of analyses two defining efforts come into focus: the Limiting Study;1 and my tenure as the head of Studies and Analyses in the headquarters of the USAF. The Damage Limiting Study was conducted circa 19631964 at the direction of Dr. Harold Brown (then the Director of Defense Research and Engineering) under the general guidance of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert McNamara. The mandate was straightforward: What are the prospects of limiting damage to the United States from a determined attack by Soviet ICBMs and Soviet bombers equipped with nuclear weapons? More specifically, what are the likely outcomes of such an attack, as a function of the resources applied by the United States to counter the attack, in terms of Surviving Population and Surviving Manufacturing Value-Added? Even more daunting, what is the optimum allocation of resources among the various players-optimum in the sense of achieving a stated outcome at least cost. The various players including: (1) Civil defense (fall-out shelters and blast shelters); (2) active defense against ballistic missiles (Nike-x); (3) active defense against Soviet bombers; and (4) counterforce attacks-attacks by Minuteman missiles against Soviet ICBM silos and bomber bases and attacks by antisubmarine forces against Soviet submarines at sea carrying SLBMs. The concept (or strategy) for limiting damage was a defense in depth: (1) counterforce attacks to reduce the number of ICBMs (and bombers) arriving at U.S. targets; (2) active defenses to reduce the number of nuclear warheads impacting on these targets; and (3) civil defense measures to alleviate the effects of those weapons that penetrated these defenses.