Deterrence in a New Security Environment

Abstract

Conclusions * One cannot quarrel with those who seek ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, provided necessary preconditions are met ... those prerequisites do not exist today. * Public debate on nuclear arms control tends to focus on numbers of weapons ... most important criterion in assessing prospective arms control measures is whether or not they contribute to stability and security. * The United States and Russia have achieved many advances in arms control and strategic stability since end of Cold War. * Radical reductions in forces or wholesale removal of forces from alert may create situations which could be dangerously destabilizing in a crisis. * States with potential to threaten United States and its allies continue to seek nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. * The United States be prepared to pose unacceptable risks to any potential adversary ... at moment, nuclear weapons are an indispensable part of that capability. * In a way not always appreciated, America's nuclear forces also complement efforts to restrict nuclear proliferation by extending an important deterrent guarantee to our allies. * The important issue is not weapons with which one might fight next major war, but to ensure that such a war does not occur ... deterrence will continue to be an indispensable element of national strategy. The Role of Nuclear Weapons The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy following Cold War has been subject of much public discussion recently. The issues are complex--much more so than headlines suggest. It's important that these issues be debated--it's essential that citizens in a free society understand them. The Cold War is over. It is important to recognize many advances in arms control and strategic stability achieved by United States and Russia in recent years. Following 1993 Bottom-Up Review of our overall defense requirements, Department of Defense embarked on a comprehensive review of Nation's Nuclear requirements. That Nuclear Posture Review-completed in September 1994--noted the reduced role nuclear weapons play in U.S. security and held out possibility of further arms control reductions. At same time, Review reaffirmed importance of a triad of strategic nuclear forces-land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers--and stressed that, long as nuclear weapons remain a factor in international life deterrence of attack on United States and our allies must be our objective. A common criticism of 1994 Nuclear Posture Review is that it appears to endorse status quo by affirming many of principles that existed in Cold War. What has often not been appreciated is extent to which America's nuclear posture has changed since end of Cold War. Consider, for example, following: * In September 1991, President George Bush took our strategic bombers off alert--up to that time, some 30% of those forces sat on strip alert, with weapons loaded on aircraft and crews ready. * Also in late 1991, President Bush announced that United States was no longer developing any new nuclear weapons. The United States has not tested a nuclear weapon since that time and has signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). * President Bush also removed all nuclear weapons from America's ground forces, and put into storage remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons. Following recommendations of 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, President William Clinton directed Navy to abandon capability of even employing nuclear weapons from its surface fleet. Overall, United States has unilaterally reduced its non-strategic nuclear arsenal some 90% from Cold War levels. * In 1993, Presidents Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed not to target each other's nations with ballistic missiles, an arrangement that went into effect in May 1994. …