Locke's Theory of Revolutionary Action

Abstract

limitation of governmental power and that, in order to be limited, political power must be shared, is the common denominator of liberal ways of thought. However, the latter are adjustable to elitist, authoritarian, and extraconstitutional notions, because to stipulate multilateral consent as the basis for sharing power does not necessarily amount to stipulating democratic or invariably constitutionally expressed consent,' Conversely, the criteria of a democratic theory are to be found not in the rejection of the rights and responsibilities of an elite, but in the procedure through which an elite attains its special rights.2 A fundamental tension results if, as in the case of Locke, universal or majority consent is postulated as the fount of legitimation but general suffrage is restricted. In Locke's case this tension is solved or partly solved as many tensions are by admitting an occasional outburst: revolution. Concessions to elitist or authoritarian prerogatives are usually predicated upon a specific evaluation of the character of the common run of men. The attempt to overcome the contradiction between the acceptance of the principle of popular consent and that of political inequality, by admitting the right of popular resistance, therefore, invites the following query. If one holds the majority of the people to be unfit to participate equally in the election, and hence in the judgment, of their representatives in more-or-less normal circumstances, how can one at the same time admit the people's umpirage when they are illtreated and made miserable to the point of despair: that is to say, when the last thing one can expect of the people is a judicious judgment? To investigate whether Locke faced this problem by extending his distrust of the majority to its revolutionary umpirage, involves consideration of whether his views on revolution add up to a consistent theory of the nature of revolutionary action. The general agreement on the importance of Locke's advocacy of the right of revolt has so far not led to such an attempt. On the contrary, it has been assumed that Locke failed to estimate the practical implications of his defense of revolution. We shall try to disprove this contention by dealing with the following questions, which are pertinent to any theory of revolution. First, to what extent was Locke's argument in favor of revolution intended to grant to the majority the competence of judging the policies of their representatives and rulers? Secondly, did Locke assume that the majority's power is only used and invariably prevails in support of just causes; and, what is the nature of the majority decision implied in the appeal to heaven? Thirdly, does Locke's justification of the right of revolt amount to advocating frequent revolt?