“A fatal error of theirs”

Abstract

This chapter examines John Locke's argument that consciousness is a sufficient condition of personal identity—that “consciousness [alone] makes personal identity.” What Locke's statement means is that unjust [P]-transfers are impossible—in which case one can't need to appeal to God to stop them. It seems that Locke's theory of personal identity rules out the possibility that there could be “fatal errors” of this sort. If so, he is inconsistent in thinking that such a fatal error is even possible (conceivable). The chapter considers [C]-transfer as a transfer of consciousness of an action from one entity to another, an entity which we may assume to be a person, and Locke's theory of personal identity taken independently of the injustice claim as the radical theory. It also evaluates Locke's assumption, made throughout his discussion of personal identity, about the diachronically continuous existence of a human subject of experience.