Abstract
The policy of “immigration federalism” has justified granting state and local police officers greatly increased responsibilities for enforcing immigration laws, but the devolution of power has also generated enormous controversy. Supporters argue that the vast number of local police and their knowledge of local conditions can substantially assist federal immigration enforcement. Critics say that the policy has caused serious problems, including increased racial profiling and more pretextual arrests for minor crimes, and that the resulting alienation of immigrant communities has reduced public safety. The controversy is not just academic, as more than 270 local jurisdictions have adopted policies designed to resist immigration federalism. In response, national legislators have now proposed legislation to squelch local resistance by cutting federal funds to those localities. Such a response is, however, fundamentally inconsistent with the very theory of federalism. The widespread resistance to immigration federalism is a reaction to the serious, if unintended consequences of localized immigration policing. A true immigration federalist should view such local resistance not as mere opposition to quash, but as a source of insight into the on-the-ground problems with current immigration policies. This article argues that the policies enacted as part of the local resistance movement may point the way both to specific solutions, and to a better – and more theoretically sound – immigration federalism.
Published Version
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