Local Discretion and Environmental Policy Making in South Korea: Three Models and a Test

Abstract

In South Korea, policy tools and priorities are set at the national level and are controlled through both budget allocations and audits conducted on an annual basis. I look at the degree to which local officials adapt their budget allocations to address local rather than national concerns in securing better air quality, using three different theoretical models: principal-agent, representative bureaucracy, and democratic responsiveness. I raise questions about the degree of control a unitary state can exercise over local problems and how this is reflected in local policy choices, especially in areas where the national government`s zone of indifference is large, such as environmental policy. Panel data across 5 years (2007 to 2012) and from 9 geographically and socioeconomically diverse areas within South Korea indicates that local officials respond to local environmental conditions by allocating more resources when needed. I discuss the implications for autonomy in a local policy space.