Abstract
Digital image alterations (morphing) of identity document photos is a major concern and may potentially allow citizens with malicious intent to enrol for identity document(s) later to be used also by another individual. Taking the photo in the application office – live enrolment – can address this issue. However, this is a break with tradition and entails a sizeable overhaul in the public sector, which can be reluctant to change and often lacks the necessary formal methods that ensure a smooth transition. The objective of this paper is to map the main barriers and drivers related to live enrolment based on theoretical research and interviews conducted with high-ranking officers at passport authorities in Estonia, Kosovo, Norway and Sweden. These countries have successfully switched to live enrolment. The main driver for live enrolment has been increased security; for Estonia, user convenience was important and was behind the decision of keeping alternative application processes for the citizens around. The absence of legacy systems makes it easier to implement public sector innovations, such as live enrolment. Behind the successful implementation is proper risk management, covering technological, political and organisational risks. Finally, the research results indicate varying experiences, obstacles, cultural differences and trade-offs, emphasizing the need to understand barriers and drivers in a contextualised way.
Highlights
Existing facial recognition algorithms are unable to fully deal with digital image alterations
While the live enrolment of fingerprints is a common standard for identity documents, such as European passports, this is not the case for passport photos
If current facial recognition algorithms are unable to fully deal with digital image alterations, and live enrolment– where photos are taken in a controlled environment in the application office – provides a way of alleviating this risk, the question becomes why are all countries not already using it
Summary
Existing facial recognition algorithms are unable to fully deal with digital image alterations This means that malicious citizens are able to apply for identity documents that can be used by another individual. The nonlive photo enrolment procedure is vulnerable to ‘morphing attacks’ [1], in which a digitally altered photograph is enrolled in order to allow two or more persons of similar appearance to use the same passport to pass visual checks of their face (both automated and manual) at border crossing points. This would mean that a known criminal could travel with the passport of somebody else. The adoption of a common standard for live enrolment of passport photos may eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, these threats
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
