Abstract

Digital image alterations (morphing) of identity document photos is a major concern, and may potentially allow citizens with malicious intent to enroll for identity document(s) later in order to be used by another individual. Taking the photo in the application office —live enrollment —can address this issue. However, this is a break with tradition and entails a sizeable overhaul in the public sector, which can be reluctant to change and often lacks the necessary formal methods that ensure a smooth transition. The objective of this paper is to map the main barriers and drivers related to live enrollment based on theoretical research and interviews conducted with high-ranking officers at passport authorities in Estonia, Kosovo, Norway, and Sweden. These countries have successfully switched to live enrollment. The main motivation for live enrollment has been increased security; for Estonia, user convenience was important and was behind the decision of keeping alternative application processes for the citizens. The absence of legacy systems makes it easier to implement public sector innovations, such as live enrollment. Behind the successful implementation is proper risk management: covering technological, political, and organizational risks. Finally, the research results indicate varying experiences, obstacles, cultural differences, and trade-offs, while emphasizing the need to understand barriers and drivers in a contextualized way.

Highlights

  • Existing facial recognition algorithms are unable to fully deal with digital image alterations1

  • If current facial recognition algorithms are unable to fully deal with digital image alterations, and live enrollment provides a way of alleviating this risk; the question becomes why are all countries not already using it

  • Our research shows that some countries have switched to live enrollment successfully, while many still use the traditional method of having citizens bring photos when applying for a passport

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Summary

Introduction

Existing facial recognition algorithms are unable to fully deal with digital image alterations. The non-live photo enrollment procedure is vulnerable to ‘morphing attacks’ (Ferrara et al, 2014), in which a digitally altered photograph is enrolled in order to allow two or more persons of similar appearance to use the same passport to pass visual checks of their face (both automated and manual) at border crossing points. This would mean that a known criminal could travel with the passport of somebody else. The adoption of a common standard for live enrollment of passport photos may eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, these threats

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