Abstract

The paper deals with fuzzifications of the coalitional game models in which the expected pay-offs of players and coalitions are known only vaguely. There exists a class of games, here we call them linear coalitional games, which can be modelled as games with, as well as without, side payments. In the deterministic case both types of models of a linear coalitional game lead to the same results. As the fuzzification of games with side-payments is based on other principles than the fuzzification of more general games without side-payments, the linear coalitional games offer situations in which both approaches to the fuzzification of coalitional game models can be compared and their differences can be clearly illustrated. In this paper the attention is focused to the analysis of concepts of superadditivity and core of coalitional games.

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