Limits of Nuclear Deterrence: The Strategic Risks and Dangers to Israel of False Hope

Abstract

Surrounded by still implacable enemies, some of which are rapidly developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons capabilities, Israel has now decided to base its very survival upon the unsteady foundations of nuclear deterrence. Although Jerusalem is taking ambitious steps to augment these fragile foundations with sophisticated active defenses (e.g., the "Arrow" ATBM), the Israeli deployment of antitactical ballistic missiles by the year 2000 will be inherently problematic. Moreover, the interim period of vulnerability will provide would-be aggressors with both an incentive and an opportunity to attack in the near term. With these facts in mind, this article points to various ways in which Israel should strengthen its nuclear deterrence posture and ways in which it should not seek security beyond the protections afforded by this posture. Thus, the argument identifies essential Israeli preparations for conventional preemptive attacks against certain enemy hard targets and for enhanced conventional deterrence. Finally, after examining some of the expected consequences of a regional nuclear war for Israel, it advances the case for a new Israeli strategic dialectic and looks productively at prospective deterrence benefits for Israel of preparations for the Samson Option, concluding with a plea that Israel's leaders promptly identify those precise configurations of nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence, preemption, and multilayered active defenses that would be optimal for the Jewish State.