Limited Access Order in Tunisia: Elements of a Political Economy of Autocratic Regimes

Abstract

In 2009, North, Wallis, and Weingast (NWW) introduced an integrative theory of institutional economics and economic history which rests on the inter-linkage of economic and political order. The article applies this novel theoretical conception to the historical development of Tunisian political economy. It is argued that the neo-Weberian concept of neopatrimonialism fills a theoretical gap as to the analysis of the structure and the dynamics of an autocratic regime and takes Tunisian economic history as an example. While the economic and political order during the pre-colonial period can be analyzed within NWW's framework, the colonial period needs conceptual modifications. Of particular interest are the mechanisms which transformed the post-colonial order into an autocratic regime and a rent-creating economic order. It is argued that a recent reformulation of neopatrimonialism, developed by political scientists based on institutional uncertainty, expands on economists’ understanding of how an autocratic regime stabilizes its political power and creates rents, doorstep conditions towards a competitive open access order notwithstanding.