Lifting the veil of secrecy – dissenting opinions in the subnational constitutional courts of Germany

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ABSTRACT Dissent is an integral feature of decision-making in collegial courts. However, unless procedural rules provide for the publication of a dissenting opinion and judges make use of this opportunity, courts appear to outsiders as impersonal, monolithic institutions. The following contribution explores dissenting opinions in German subnational constitutional courts (Landesverfassungsgerichte). Today, most of these courts provide for open dissenting opinions. Based on an empirical analysis of 1,115 cases decided by the constitutional courts of ten states (Länder) over a ten-year period (2009–2018), I find that dissent is driven predominantly by decision-level factors. Notably, the likelihood of dissent increases where a decision taps into the relationship between federal and state constitutional law and where more than one dissenting opinion is published. By contrast, I find no evidence for ideology or career background to impinge on the decision of a judge to author a dissenting opinion.