Abstract
Acknowledgements Contributors 1. Free will, libertarianism, and Kane David Palmer Part I: Libertarian Theories of Free Will 2. Can an indeterministic cause leave a choice up to the agent? Carl Ginet 3. Free will and metaphysics Timothy O'Connor Part II: The Luck Objection 4. Kane, luck, and control: Trying to get by without too much effort Alfred Mele 5. Toward a solution to the luck problem John Martin Fischer Part III: Incompatibilism and Omissions 6. Compatibilist ultimacy: Resisting the threat of Kane's U condition Michael McKenna 7. The direct argument for incompatibilism David Widerker and Ira M. Schnall 8. Freedom, responsibility, and omitting to act Randolph Clarke Part IV: The Significance of Free Will 9. Responsibility for emotions, alternative possibilities, and reasons Ishtiyaque Haji 10. Moral responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and the significance of (libertarian) free will Dana Kay Nelkin 11. The dialectic of selfhood and the significance of free will Derk Pereboom Part V: Kane's Reply 12. New arguments in debates on libertarian free will: Responses to contributors Robert Kane References Index
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