Liberal Culturalism and the National Minority/Immigrant Dichotomy

Catherine Lu

doi:10.7202/1035336ar

Abstract

Is the discrepancy between the cultural and linguistic rights of immigrants on the one hand and national groups on the other justified, with the latter group typically enjoying a fuller set of such rights than the former category? Patten presents a case for accepting some modest departures from neutrality in the treatment of immigrants’ cultural rights and that of majority and minority national groups. I challenge his thesis by asking whether such departures are justified with respect to already settled (as opposed to prospective) immigrants; whether the situational argument for unequal treatment is inconsistent with the theory of culture offered earlier in the book; and whether contexts of historical injustice against immigrant groups might complicate judgements about the national minority/immigrant dichotomy with respect to minority cultural rights.

Highlights

Overall, Patten’s theory of equal recognition does not make a normative distinction between national and immigrant groups
I think, is rightfully criticizing this popular discourse, especially if its implication is that second- and third-generation members of historical immigrant groups do not enjoy the same rights to fair opportunity for self-determination as members of dominant national groups, majority or minority
According to Patten’s argument, even first-generation immigrant cultural minorities can appeal to the liberal principle of neutrality in support of their demand for certain cultural or linguistic rights

Summary

Introduction

Patten’s theory of equal recognition does not make a normative distinction between national and immigrant groups. According to Patten’s argument, even first-generation immigrant cultural minorities can appeal to the liberal principle of neutrality in support of their demand for certain cultural or linguistic rights.

Results

Conclusion