Liability for nuclear accidents in Belgium from an interest group perspective

Abstract

Liability for nuclear accidents in Belgium is governed by a strict liability rule and subjected to compulsory liability insurance. In addition the compensation due to the victim is limited. The regulation of the nuclear risk has traditionally been explained, both by the legislator and by legal doctrine, on victim protection grounds. Many lawyers favour the evolution towards an expanding strict liability and compulsory insurance, arguing that these devices suit the need of effective victim protection. Taking a closer look at the regulation, it, however, becomes clear that its contents cannot entirely be explained on victim protection grounds. The legal mechanisms used are not effective means of victim protection. Indeed, as will be explained below, compared with the previous law, strict liability combined with a limit to compensation does not improve the situation of the victim substantially. Moreover, the advantages of strict liability and compulsory insurance have to be weighed against the disadvantages of the regulation for the victim (such as the channeling of liability and the short periods of limitation) before definitive conclusions with respect to the victim’s position can be drawn. A better insight in statutory arrangements can often be achieved by analyzing them from an interest group perspective. This is true both for market and non-market regulations, such as liability rules. The purpose of this paper is to use the Belgian regulatory framework for nuclear accidents to show that the interest group theory of regulation can also help to provide a better understanding of regulations concerning liability rules and insurance. Hitherto this theory has mostly been applied to explain the passage of legislation in fields of production and distribution. In this paper we use interest group theories of regulation to find an explanation for some odd legal rules which do not serve the goal of victim protection, pronounced by the legislator. We start from the assumption of rational behaviour by utility-maximizing politicians. Useful insights will be obtained by examining the regulation as a form of rent-