Li (禮), or Ritual Propriety: A Preface to a Confucian Philosophy of Human Action

Abstract

AbstractIn this paper, I propose an interpretation of the Confucian concept of li or Ritual Propriety, and suggest a new philosophy of action and mind on the basis of the concept. To achieve this aim, I focus upon and analyze passages in The Analects, and try to establish major Confucian theses on human action. By comparing Confucian views on human action with Western ones, I shed light on the originality of the concept of li.Major theses on li in The Analects are as follows: (1) As an essential characteristic of human behavior, li is ordinary and ubiquitous. (2) Li is a socialized form of our mind, is the outside of an inside, and as such presupposes the unity of the mind and body. (3) Li is a social medium through which we interact with others in order to achieve common values and to turn our society into a harmonious and aesthetic space. To argue for the above theses, I focus on the centrality of language in our life, and utilize Russian psychologist Vygotsky's theory of language learning as well as Wittgenstein's concept of language game, together with the Confucian theory of correct names.