Abstract
The enactive approach and the skilled intentionality framework are two closely related forms of radical embodied cognition that nonetheless exhibit important differences. In this paper, I focus on a conceptual disparity regarding the normative character of action and perception. Whereas the skilled intentionality framework describes the norms of action and perception as the capacity of embodied agents to become attuned (i.e., skilled intentionality) to preestablished normative frameworks (i.e., situated normativity), the enactive approach describes the same phenomenon as the enactment of norms (i.e., as sense-making) at different levels of organization that go from individual biological agents to linguistic encounters. I will argue that although both accounts accurately recognize important features of the norms of action and perception, they also have significant shortcomings. Norm-attunement accurately sees normative, ecological frameworks as the necessary set of constraints for the existence of norms at play in sociocultural bodily practices, but it fails to acknowledge the temporal and open-ended character of these norms and frameworks. Norm-enactment, by contrast, acknowledges that norms of action and perception are temporally open-ended, but fails to explicitly recognize that environmental normative frameworks are necessary for the enactment and development of all sort of norms in the interactional domain of an agent-environment system. To overcome these problems, I propose an enactive-ecological approach to norms of action and perception. This approach consists in describing norm-enactment as a result of a developmental process I call norm-development. This process describes the enactment of norms from the background of ecological, normative frameworks. These frameworks are norms enacted in the past of the interactional history of the agent-environment system that remain open to new configurations (new norms) in the present. To clarify conceptually norm-development, I appeal to Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of norms of perception, and more particularly to his concept of spatial levels. Like the enactive approach, Merleau-Ponty recognizes that perceptual norms emerge in the interactional history of the agent-environment system, but, like the skilled intentionality framework, he also posits that normative frameworks, that he calls levels, enable and constrain the emergence of perceptual norms and its development. Levels are therefore a phenomenological description of ecological normative frameworks that has been temporally constituted and that stay temporally open-ended as a fundamental requisite for the enactment and development of norms of action and perception.
Highlights
The enactive approach and the ecological approach of the skilled intentionality framework are two radical forms of embodied cognition that reject the orthodox conception of cognition as a computational function that is physically implemented in brain processes (e.g., Anderson, 2007; Metzinger, 2009)
Feelings of dissatisfaction and solicitations of action are grounded on public standards. This description led scholars in the skilled intentionality framework to adopt the idea that situated normativity does not refer to norms enacted by individuals, but to norms that rule the habitual patterns of bodily practices of a sociocultural group
When we describe the emergence of a vital norm, like E. coli bacteria perceiving glucose as food, we cannot state that an organism projects meaning on a raw physical substance
Summary
The enactive approach and the ecological approach of the skilled intentionality framework are two radical forms of embodied cognition that reject the orthodox conception of cognition as a computational function that is physically implemented in brain processes (e.g., Anderson, 2007; Metzinger, 2009). Both the enactive approach and the skilled intentionality framework conceive cognition as an activity rooted in the dynamic sensorimotor coupling of the body and the environment (Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014; Varela et al, 2016) This coupling permits cognitive agents to establish successful cycles of action and perception in bodily practices (Di Paolo et al, 2017; Rietveld et al, 2018), and to lay the foundation for other, more complex forms of cognition (Di Paolo et al, 2018; Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2018). Normenactment, by contrast, acknowledges that norms of action and perception are temporally open-ended and, are open to constant changes in light of the complex dynamics of bodily practices, but the enactive approach fails to explicitly recognize that ecological and normative frameworks are necessary for the enactment and development of all sort of norms in the interactional domain of an agentenvironment system. I will unpack these two fundamental concepts
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
