Leveled Multi-Hop Multi-Identity Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Abstract

Gentry, Sahai, and Waters (CRYPTO 2013) proposed the notion of multi-identity fully homomorphic encryption (MIFHE), which allows homomorphic evaluation of data encrypted under multiple identities. Subsequently, Clear and McGoldrick (CANS 2014, CRYPTO 2015) proposed leveled MIFHE candidates. However, the proposed MIFHE is either based on iO, which is a nonstandard assumption or single hop; that is, an arbitrary “evaluated” ciphertext under a set of identities is difficult to further evaluate when new ciphertexts are encrypted under additional identities. To overcome these drawbacks, we propose a leveled multi-hop MIFHE scheme. In a multi-hop MIFHE scheme, one can evaluate a group of ciphertexts under a set of identities to obtain an “evaluated” ciphertext, which can be further evaluated with other ciphertexts encrypted under additional identities. We also show that the proposed MIFHE scheme is secure against selective identity and chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-sID-CPA) under the learning with errors (LWE) assumption.