"Let us imagine...": Wittgenstein's Invitation to Philosophy

Beth Savickey

doi:10.15845/nwr.v4i2.3292

Abstract

Wendy Lee-Lampshire writes that Wittgenstein’s conception of language has something valuable to offer feminist attempts to construct epistemologies firmly rooted in the social, psychological and physical situations of language users (1999: 409). However, she also argues that his own use of language exemplifies a form of life whose constitutive relationships are enmeshed in forms of power and authority. For example, she interprets the language game of the builders as one of slavery, and questions how we read and respond to it. She asks: “Who are ‘we’ as Wittgenstein’s reader(s)?” This is an important question, and how we answer offers insight not only into our own philosophical practices, but also into Wittgenstein’s use of language games. With the words “Let us imagine...”, Wittgenstein invites readers to participate in creative, collaborative, and improvisational language games that alter not only the texts themselves, but our relationship with others.

Highlights

In the opening of the Investigations, Wittgenstein introduces the language game of the builders: Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right
Wittgenstein’s example contextualizes the epistemic situation of language users, LeeLampshire claims that his philosophy: exemplifies a form of life whose constitutive relationships are enmeshed in forms of power and authority and which, reflected in the language-games that help to support them, serve to delegitimate the knowledge claims of some while reinforcing the privileged status of others. (1999: 410)
The grammatical complexity of language games is generic “man” conspicuously absent from Wittgenstein’s texts, but Lee-Lampshire herself notes that generic “man” is unimaginable

Summary

Introduction

In the opening of the Investigations, Wittgenstein introduces the language game of the builders (in response to Augustine’s description of the learning of human language): Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. For generic “man” is a subject characterized by a lack of context: “Reference to “him” is reference to no one in particular located nowhere in particular; neither slave nor builder, “he” is literally unimaginable” (Lee-Lampshire 1999: 416) She continues: we could not substitute references to generic “man” with more clearly contextualized references to specific “men.” For as the example of slavery makes starkly clear, if we imagine the builders to be nongeneric, epistemically situated men, the references to “lives like our own” cannot possibly be understood to refer to all of “us”. With the exception of the language game of the builders, Lee-Lampshire does not demonstrate the use of (or reference to) generic “man” in Wittgenstein’s Investigations This is necessary, because one of the most noteworthy aspects of his writings is the grammatical complexity of his texts and methods. He uses language in all of its persons, tenses, and numbers.

The grammatical complexity of language games

Language games as improvisational

The purpose of language games

The methodological implications of playing language games

Conclusion