Lessons of the Korean War for the "Six-Party Talks"

Abstract

W ith apologies to Mark Twain, rumors of the North Korean nuclear weapons pro gram's impending demise have been greatly exaggerated. After their September 2005 meet ings Beijing, to be sure, the protagonists the on Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program-North Korea, South Korea, China, the United States, Japan, and Russia issued a historic joint that seemed to break the longstanding deadlock.1 In the joint statement, the Bush administration promised not to attack North Korea, while Kim Jong-Il's gov ernment promised to cease its bomb-building efforts. Many commentators hailed the docu ment, but the euphoria was short-lived. Although the parties managed to agree prin ciple on a settlement, they did so by deferring discussion of the most contentious issues con fronting them and leaving the language of the joint statement vague, allowing each govern ment to interpret the terms as it saw fit.2 Diplo mats on sides declared victory. Little changed on the ground. Indeed, only a day after inking the agreement, Pyongyang announced that it would not disarm until the United States furnished it with light water reactors, meeting one of its perennial demands. Washington, which has made plete, verifiable, and irreversible a precondition for any accord, demurred.3 Speaking to reporters at the United Nations (UN), Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice delivered a tart rejoinder to Pyongyang: We will stick to the text of the Beijing statement and I believe that we can make progress if every body sticks to what was actually to.4 But a reasonable reading of the joint statement supported not only Washington's interpretation of the text, but also that of Pyongyang. Both sides pointed to certain provisions the joint statement. The parties, for instance, unani mously reaffirmed their mutual commitment to verifiable denuclearization of the peninsula. North Korea vowed not only to dismantle all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear pro grams, but also to return to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, which it denounced 2002, and to accept UN safeguards, assuring that it does not resume military activities at new nuclear installations.5 So far, so good. But North Korea also cham pioned its right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea expressed their respect for this claim and agreed to discuss at the appropriate time providing light-water reactors to meet North Korea's pressing energy needs. The six parties further pledged to imple ment the agreement in a phased manner line with the principle of 'commitment for commit ment, action for action.'6 Neither side has retreated much, if at all, from its longstanding bargaining position. Pyongyang wants commercial nuclear power plants, and it wants them at an early date, not after its nuclear hardware-Kim Jong-Il's pri mary bargaining chip-has been boxed up. The Bush administration, as Secretary Rice's state ment showed, will continue to press for com plete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament before discussing any concessions. The outlook, then, is for more posturing and wrangling before the talks can reach a final set tlement. Although the Beijing joint statement represented a welcome development, it now seems clear that the six-party talks have simply entered a new phase. Washington is unlikely to get it wants from the on-again, off-again James R. Holmes is a senior research associate at the Univer sity of Georgia Center for Inter national Trade and Security, Athens, GA, and a former profes sor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI. His current research focuses on Chinese naval strategy and sea power Asia. Copyright ? 2006 American Peace Society