Abstract
Abstract This article identifies the most significant atrocity risk factors and their indicators in accordance with the UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes and provides a taxonomy of measures, taken by a variety of external and internal stakeholders, in different combinations, which reduced the risk of atrocity crimes reoccurring after the 2009 stadium massacre in Conakry, Guinea. On the 28th of September 2009, 157 protesters were killed, at least 1200 were injured, and over 100 women were raped by security forces in a stadium in Conakry. The UN’s Commission of Inquiry (coi) concluded that these crimes committed by the security forces amounted to crimes against humanity. The efforts to halt further violence and prevent the commission of crimes post-2009 stadium massacre were varied and encompassed regional and international preventive diplomacy. The coordination of a coherent political strategy among international, regional and sub-regional actors in the Guinean context contributed towards the perceived success in preventing further atrocities in Guinea, post-2009 massacre. Importantly, Guinea is not a typical example in terms of atrocity and conflict prevention, due to a unique regional and global dynamics that allowed for a rapid and rather coherent response to the September 2009 stadium massacre.
Highlights
Since gaining independence from France in 1958, Guinea has had a history of autocratic and military political leadership coupled with serious human rights abuses and violence, often committed along ethnic lines
This article identifies the most significant atrocity risk factors and their indicators in accordance with the UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes and provides a taxonomy of measures, taken by a variety of external and internal stakeholders, in different combinations, which reduced the risk of atrocity crimes reoccurring after the 2009 stadium massacre in Conakry, Guinea
The effectiveness of all these measures, taken together, was facilitated by the already existing diplomatic links and by the African-led institutional framework that was put in place after the 2008 coup
Summary
Since gaining independence from France in 1958, Guinea has had a history of autocratic and military political leadership coupled with serious human rights abuses and violence, often committed along ethnic lines. Against a background of unlawful transitions of power, endemic corruption and poor governance,[2] increasing poverty,[3] authoritarianism, hostility to political dissent, and an increasingly militarised society,[4] protests and heavy reliance on ruling party militias and security forces to intimidate and repress opposition[5] have become the norm within the country This is in conjunction with widespread impunity for human rights abuses committed by those party militias and security forces. Following the death of President Conté in December 2008, a group of military officers, calling themselves the National Council for Democracy and Development (cndd), launched a coup Despite regional and international actors’ presence and efforts in Guinea after the 2008 coup, the measures that were taken focused mainly on restoring constitutional order rather than on atrocity prevention, leaving many atrocity risk factors unaddressed
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