Abstract
ABSTRACT In what ways did Beijing learn from the strategy, tactics and legality of sanction campaigns in international relations? What accounts for shifts in the Chinese thinking on sanctions in the past two decades? By analyzing the evolution of scholarly discussions about economic statecraft from 2001 to 2022, the article illustrates a dilemma: how to condemn U.S. unilateral sanctions while advocating for China’s own experimentation with economic coercion? The rising tension shifted the focus on the legality and legitimacy of U.S. sanctions to China’s own economic leverages and legal framework for coercive economic statecraft. Moreover, by muddling the distinction between defensive anti-sanctions measures and offensive use of sanctions, the new legislative development may usher China in a new phase of using coercive economic statecraft.
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