Leakage-resilient CCA2-secure certificateless public-key encryption scheme without bilinear pairing

Abstract

In practical applications, an encryption scheme should withstand various leakage attacks (e.g., side-channel attacks, cold-boot attacks, etc.). Thus, in this paper, a new leakage-resilient certificateless public-key encryption (LR-CL-PKE) scheme is presented, and whose security is based on the classic decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) assumption. Considering the computational costs, because without bilinear pairing, our construction is more efficient than traditional LR-CL-PKE schemes. Based on the hardness of the DDH assumption, the security of our proposal is proved. Furthermore, in the leakage setting, our construction can keep its claimed security even if the adversary can learn a certain amount of additional information on the secret key through various leakage attacks.