Abstract
This article examines how expectations about the likelihood of a dictator’s death affect the strategic calculations of regime insiders and potential challengers. On the one hand, would-be reformers are better positioned to plan and execute post-death challenges as dictators age. On the other hand, regime insiders anticipate these challenges and try to proactively solve the problem of political succession. The circumstances surrounding leader death determine which of these competing effects dominates. Accordingly, leader death is more liberalizing as leaders age in personalist regimes compared to nonpersonalist regimes, and in countries with high levels of economic development compared to those with low levels of development. Furthermore, preemptive actions in personalist dictatorships, such as coup attempts and irregular removals, are more likely as leaders age and their death becomes imminent.
Published Version
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