Le problème de la compréhension de la dualité de la téléologie d’Aristote comme « but » et « bénéficiaire »

Abstract

Abstract This study intends to show that the usually given meaning of the teleological dualism τὸ οὗ/τὸ ᾧ of Aristotle’s De anima, understood as “an aim or goal” and “the beneficiary”, does not come from Aristotle, but from a controversial interpretation of the ancient commentators. It originates on the attempt of certain Peripatetics to appropriate the Stoic distinction between “happiness” and “the happy subject” designated as the σκοπός and the τέλος of moral action. After this historical accuracy, we will propose a different reading of the Aristotelian distinction according to the context of De anima as designating the tendency in the individual towards its preservation and use.