Abstract
Continuous professionalisation of safety management in European railways does not always have a desirable effect on lowering the risk to the tolerable level. A recent example of this issue is the safety in level crossing in Poland, assessed negatively by the Polish Supreme Audit Office in 2017. Potential reasons may be the marginalisation of system-specific and local safety knowledge, as well as the increasing role of procedures over experience and knowledge, which has been reported in scientific papers from several European countries. For addressing this issue, we propose a new model for safety systems, which helps to understand the relationships among safety system elements, safety functions, and hazards and their sources. The application of the model is intuitive for the purpose of allowing the cooperation of people with different backgrounds, knowledge, and experience, and can be used, among others, to guide local authorities in their potential interventions which aim to lower the risk on level crossings and their vicinity. The application of the model in other high-risk domains, as well as during the design phase of new technical objects is also possible.
Published Version
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