Abstract
I will defend Armstrong and Tooley's theory of laws by challenging the inferences from step (1) to (2) and from steps (3) and (4) to (5). I argue that there is no parallel case for positing an irreducibly second-order relation of coincidence. Moreover, even if we were to posit such a relation, I also argue that it would be significantly unlike the nomological relation in that it would relate not properties, but only particulars. A further consequence of this is that the coincidence relation would not be irreducibly second-
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