Abstract
ABSTRACT What explains varying legislative outcomes in authoritarian regimes? On issues related to regime legitimacy or political stability, legislative outcomes have been attributed to power division or social threat. The article complements the literature by examining two single-party regimes, China and Vietnam. China promulgated an assembly law in 1989 and Vietnam has not to date. Primarily based on original materials, including political memoirs, historical archives, and materials published by the legislature and public security organs, we show how contested ideas held by political elites about the function of law define the discursive premises of legislative deliberation and thereby shaping legislative outcomes.
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